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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON*

Abstract
The early nineteenth century in America was a period in which
the idea of religious liberty came to be worked out in practice in
a setting of growing diversity.

The immediate effect of the

dissolution of state religious establishments was to strengthen
the vitality and prestige of the churches themselves. Before the
end of the century, the church historian Philip Schaff could
regard as normal ‘a free church in a free state, or a selfsupporting and self-governing Christianity in independent but
friendly relation to the civil government.’

I

INTRODUCTION

The representation of the Constitution of the United States as ‘the supreme
law of the land’, which echoes the phrase ‘law of the land’ in the Magna
Carta, refers to more than the document itself. 1 It is unnecessary to
speculate about the exact intent of the founders when the very language of
the Constitution attests to its continuity with and even incorporation of
common law or higher law concepts.

Indeed, this understanding was

*

BA, MA, PhD. Professor of Government, Helms School of Government, Liberty
University, Lynchburg, Virginia.

1

This article is largely drawn from the fifth and sixth chapters, “The American
Commonwealth” and “Early Constitutional Issues,” of the author’s doctoral
dissertation. Steven Alan Samson, Crossed Swords: Entanglements Between
Church and State in America. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1984.
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affirmed by the founders themselves and has been periodically reaffirmed
by members of the judiciary.2 As Edward S. Corwin contended:
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground solely of its
rootage in popular will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth
of American constitutional theory.

Earlier the supremacy accorded to

constitutions was ascribed less to their putative source than to their
supposed content, to their embodiment of an essential and unchanging
justice. ... There are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice
which are entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, all together
regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the
community.3

The principles of higher law jurisprudence may be traced to the earliest
period of modern western law. In the twelfth century, for example, Gratian

2

Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law (Cornell University Press, 1955) 89. See R. Kemp Morton, God in the
Constitution (Cokesbury Press, 1933) 110116. See also H. E. Bradford, ‘And
God Defend the Right: The American Revolution and the Limits of Christian
Obedience’ (1983) Christianity and Civilization 239: "According to the Old Whig
view of the English Constitution, it was not a contract but a source of identity—
with no author but the nation and its history, with God an implicit party to the
process. As covenant qua law it grew out of the interaction of people and princes
living out of the nation's genius, with God's blessing its confirmation. These
assumptions undergird most of the early American political documents." Henry
Steele Commager, ‘Constitutional History and the Higher Law’ in Conyers Read
(ed), The Constitution Reconsidered (Harper Torchbooks, revised ed, 1968) 225–
226, cited several affirmations of this sort as expressions of an early higher law
tradition in early American jurisprudence. While Commager, who wrote this
essay in 1938, claimed that the tradition's underlying philosophy had been
repudiated three-quarters of a century earlier, he did acknowledge its importance
in constitutional history: ‘Americans, having discovered the usefulness of natural
law, elaborated it, and having justified its application by success, protected that
success by transforming natural into constitutional law: the state and federal
constitutions. And in so far as natural law had found refuge in written law, there
was little reason to invoke it; it was automatically invoked whenever the
constitution was invoked, and this was the logic of t1arshall in the Marbury case.’
Ibid 228.

3

Ibid 4.
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wrote: ‘Enactments (constitutiones), whether ecclesiastical or secular, if
they are proved to be contrary to natural law, must be totally excluded.’4
The new federal union was, in effect, given the authority to coordinate the
political system but not to dominate it. Its overall success assumes the
continued good health of the various social institutions, such as families
and churches, that also exercise powers of a governmental nature. The
safeguards built into the constitutional system ultimately depend on the
consensus and self-restraint of its component parts.

This is a key to

properly understanding the relationship between church and state as it was
originally envisioned. As James Madison remarked during the ratification
debates in Virginia: "There is not a shadow of a right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion.

Its least interference with it

would be a most flagrant usurpation."5
Like the Declaration, the Constitution is based on the premise that the
primary purpose of civil government is essentially negative rather than
positive: that is, protective, prohibitory, and punitive. Since its power is
coercive by nature rather than simply persuasive, the founders believed that
civil authority must be constitutionally restrained. James Madison declared
that an accumulation of powers in the same hands "may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."6 Alexander Hamilton similarly
urged that the original grant of powers to Congress was a limited one:

4

Harold J. Berman, ‘The Origins of Western Legal Science’ (1977) 90 Harvard
Law Review 925.

5

Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphia in 1787 (J. B. Lippincott & Co., 2nd ed, 1863) vol 1, p. 330.

6

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist: A
Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Edward Mead Earle
(New York: Modern Library) 313. Quoting Federalist, no. 47. See also Abraham
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The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other
words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases.
This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a
general legislative authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers
would absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was intended.7

Likewise, in his Farewell Address, George Washington cautioned against
the tendency of governments to usurp power:
If, in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an
amendment in the way which the constitution designates. —But let there be
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the
instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments
are destroyed.—The precedent must always greatly overbalance in
permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time
yield.— Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity,
Religion, and Morality are indispensable supports.—In vain would that man
claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and
Citizens.8

But this warning has been largely ignored because the focus of American
politics is more generally on the means rather than on commonly conceded
ends. Chief Justice John Marshall helped set the stage—and the tone—for
many subsequent controversies by adopting a sweeping view of proper
constitutional means in McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819):

Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978)
9699, on the practical implications of sphere sovereignty.
7

Ibid 541, quoting Federalist, no. 83.

8

Charles W Eliot (ed), The Harvard Classics: American Historical Documents
1000-1904 (Collier & Son, 1910) vol 3, 260.
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Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.

One of the great challenges to constitutional liberty has come through a
gradual shift of emphasis from prohibition to regulation, from a protective
to a beneficent or philanthropic conception of civil power.9 What Alexis de
Tocqueville subsequently wrote about the regulation of manufacturing
associations might be applied with equal validity to the regulation of
religious activity:
If once the sovereign had a general right of authorizing associations of all
kinds upon certain conditions, he would not be long without claiming the
right of superintending and managing them, in order to prevent them from
departing from the rules laid down by himself. In this manner the state,
after having reduced all who are desirous of forming associations into
dependence, would proceed to reduce into the same condition all who
belong to associations already formed; that is to say, almost all the men who
are now in existence.10

9

See Frederick Bastiat, The Law (Dean Russell trans, The Foundation for
Economic Education, Inc., 1950) 21–29; H L Richardson, What Makes You Think
We Read the Bills? (Caroline House Books, 1978) 79–89; T. Robert Ingram, The
Two Powers (St Thomas Press, 1959) 15.

10

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Henry Reeve trans, Phillips
Bradley (ed), Vintage Books, 1945) vol 2, 33031. Walter Lippmann regarded it
as ‘an extraordinary paradox’ that the intellectual leaders of the 1930's believed
such detailed regulation to be necessary. As an illustration, he cited Lewis
Mumford: "As industry advances in mechanization, a greater weight of political
authority must develop outside than was necessary in the past.” Lewis Mumford,
Technics and Civilization (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1934; Harbinger, 1963) 420.
Regarding this kind of other-directedness, Lippmann commented: "Is it not truly
extraordinary that in the latest phase of the machine technic we are advised that
we must return to the political technic—that is, to the sumptuary laws and the
forced labour which were the universal practice in the earlier phases of the
machine technic? I realise that Mr Mumford hopes and believes that the
omnipotent sovereign power will now be as rational in its purposes and its
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The success of the struggle for political liberty was soon followed by a
growth of religious liberty and the collapse of denominational
establishments. For a time, centralizing tendencies were held in check.

II

THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN REPUBLIC

The idea of religious liberty is best understood in the context of a
prolonged practical experiment.

Many of the colonies, particularly

Plymouth Plantation (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1630), Maryland (1634),
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1636), Connecticut (1636), New
Haven (1640), and Pennsylvania (1681), were settled by religious
dissenters who wished to be free to practice their faith unmolested.
Religious liberty was born in the crucible of conflicting European religious
practices which spilled over into a distant land. Denominational traditions
were put to the test under frontier conditions characterized by slow
communication, fluid migration, and the intermingling and fusion of
various religious and political ideas.

As Alexis de Tocqueville later

observed of the result: “Religion in America takes no direct part in the
government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political
institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use
of it. ...”11
A century after the Constitution was ratified, church historian Philip Schaff
reviewed the development of religious liberty in America and detected a
close connection between the American political and religious consensus.

measures as are the physicists and chemists who have invented alloys and
harnessed electricity. But the fact remains that he believes the beneficent promise
of modern science can be realized only through the political technology of the
pre-scientific ages." Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (Grosset & Dunlop,
1936) 89.
11

Ibid vol 1, 316.
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If we speak of a Christian nation we must take the word in the qualified
sense of the prevailing religious sentiment and profession; for in any nation
and under any relation of church and state, there are multitudes of
unbelievers, misbelievers, and hypocrites. ... With this understanding, we
may boldly assert that the American nation is as religious and as Christian
as any nation on earth, and in some respects even more so, for the very
reason that the profession and support of religion are left entirely free.
State-churchism is apt to breed hypocrisy and infidelity, while freechurchism favors the growth of religion.12

Schaff regarded as distinctively American the easy cooperation between
religious and civil institutions, characterized by "a free church in a free
state, or a self-supporting and self-governing Christianity in independent
but friendly relation to the civil government."13 He concluded that the
American system of law could not have originated from any other religious
soil, adding that "we may say that our laws are all the more Christian
because they protect the Jew and the infidel, as well as the Christian of
whatever creed, in the enjoyment of the common rights of men and
citizens.”14
The nature of the difference between the state church and free church
viewpoints may be seen in the different versions of the Westminster
Confession of Faith, the most influential of Protestant doctrinal statements
used in America. Originally, the twenty-third chapter of the Confession—
entitled "Of the Civil Magistrate"—reflected the "national church" concept
accepted in England and Scotland, where—even in 1647—it was somewhat
12

Philip Schaff, ‘Church and State in the United States: or The American Idea of
Religious Liberty and Its Practical Effects’ in Papers of the American Historical
Association (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888) vol 2, no 4, 5455.

13

Ibid 9.

14

Ibid 62.
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at variance with the congregational establishments of New England. The
third section of the original chapter reads:
The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the
word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven:
yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be
preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all
blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in
worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God
duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof,
he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that
whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.15

Despite a marked break with the pure Erastian view that the church is
subject to the state, the assumption of a national establishment that
underlay the Confession did not square with either the decentralized
establishments of seventeenth century New England or the later voluntary
church concept.16 As early as 1729, the Presbyterian synod of Philadelphia
adopted the Westminster standards with modifications. The wording in
three of the chapters was formally changed in 1788.

The commonly

accepted American revision of chapter 23, section three, reflects a
conception of religious liberty which strongly resembles that of the First
Amendment, even though it predated the Amendment by a year:
Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the
word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven;
15

Ibid 50.

16

An attempt by Robert Child and others to petition Parliament to support a
Presbyterian establishment in New England and appoint a governor-general was
successfully averted in 1647 by the General Court. John Fiske, The Beginnings of
New England, or the Puritan Theocracy in Its Relations to Civil and Religious
Liberty (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930) 18891; Samuel Eliot Morison,
Builders of the Bay Colony (Houghton Mifflin Company, revised ed, 1958) 24468.
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or, in the least, interfere in matters of faith. Yet, as nursing fathers, it is the
duty of civil magistrates to protect the church of our common Lord, without
giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest, in
such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full,
free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred
functions, without violence or danger. And, as Jesus Christ hath appointed a
regular government and discipline in his church, no law of any
commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder, the due exercise thereof,
among the voluntary members of any denomination of Christians, according
to their own profession and belief. It is the duty of civil magistrates to
protect the person and good name of all their people, in such an effectual
manner as that no person be suffered, either upon pretense of religion or
infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other
person whatsoever: and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical
assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance.17

But the problems of jurisdiction and sovereignty are not suddenly resolved
by the simple expedient of substituting a "neutral state'' for a "confessional
state."18 In fact, this concept of neutrality or disinterestedness has--by its
lack of definition--introduced a genuine ambiguity into the relationship
between church and state that very likely encouraged not only the
proliferation of antagonistic sects but also the creation of public agencies
that have duplicated—and sometimes replaced—various church ministries.
For the most part, the Christian character of the social order was taken for
granted.

But it may not have been simply the blithe indifference of

churches to the hazards of Erastianism that led them to support a greater
role by the state in public education and welfare. Robert Handy explains
17

Schaff, above n 12, 50. For an example of the new attitude, see Gardiner Spring,
Obligations of the World to the Bible: A Series of Lectures to Young Men (Taylor
& Dodd, 1839) 14549.

18

The terms "neutrality of the state" and "state confessionalism" are used in E. R.
Norman, The Conscience of the State in North America (University Press, 1968).
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that "the overtones of religious establishment implicit in much of what they
did then was not clear to them, because as they developed new ways they
did not realize how much of the old patterns they carried over the wall of
separation into their new vision of Christian civilization."19 Well into the
twentieth century, historian Edward Humphrey could still write:
The American conception allows for national characteristics that are
independent of the state.

So we are a Christian nation even though

Christianity is not a feature of the American state. The adoption of the
American concept of the limited state resulted in the ideal of a free church in
a free nation, the present American ideal of religious freedom.

As a

corollary to this we have the ideal of a state freed from ecclesiastical
control.20

These words echo the sentiments of earlier and even later commentators,
including judges and legal scholars like James Kent, Joseph Story, Thomas
Cooley, David Brewer, and William O. Douglas.21 Yet the general respect
19

Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities
(Oxford University Press, 1971) 40.

20

Edward Frank Humphrey, Nationalism and Religion in America, 1774-1789
(Chipman Law Publishing Company, 1924) 2.

21

See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, ed. 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (Little,
Brown, and Company, 12 ed, 1873) vol 2, 3435 (45); Joseph Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States; With a Preliminary Review of the
Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the
Constitution (Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833; reprinted Da Capo Press, 1970)
vol. 3, 72627; Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law
in the United States of America, ed. Andrew C. McLaughlin, (Little, Brown, and
Company, 3rd ed, 1898) 22425. The definitive judicial statement regarding the
Christian character of the American constitutional system is probably the lengthy
obiter dictum by Justice David Brewer in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). Justice William O. Douglas appears to have made
special reference to the long series of polygamy cases, particularly Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), when he wrote: “a ‘religious’ rite which violates
standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true sense, in the
constitutional sense, included within ‘religion,’ the ‘free exercise’ of which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.” William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty
(Doubleday and Company, 1954) 304.
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for Christianity did little to prevent the now commonly accepted
compartmentalization of spiritual and temporal concerns. The divorce of
religion from practical life appears to be the result of a dualistic attitude
that regards the state as "worldly" and the church as "otherworldly,"
diminishing the reputation of both. In this, it resembles the tendency of
innumerable church heresies throughout history. 22 Thus religion as a
private concern of individuals is separated from politics as the public
concern of communities.23
The struggle for religious liberty during the last half of the eighteenth
century succeeded in discrediting any remaining pretense that the kingdom
of God could be established through coercion rather than conversion. John
Locke's view that a church "is a free and voluntary Society" soon
prevailed.24 But with public opinion divided on the nature and extent of
this new religious liberty, any consideration of the positive responsibilities
of the state with respect to religion was obliged to take a back seat to the
fight for disestablishment. As a result, important issues were not fully
addressed. If, according to the Westminster standards, civil magistrates are
22

Some of the antecedents of this dualism are examined in a chapter entitled "The
Socialism of the Heresies" in Igor Shafarevich, The Socialist Phenomenon
(William Tjalsma trans, Harper-Row, 1980) 1879.

23

See Richard E. Morgan, The Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in
America (Pegasus, 1968) 22, who quoted Roger Williams to the effect that the
church should be regarded as just another private association: "… [L]ike unto a
Body or College of Physicians in a City; like unto a Corporation, Society or
Company of East-Indie or Turkie-Merchants, or any other Society or Company in
London; Which Companies may hold their Courts, keep their Records; hold
disputations; and in matters concerning their Society, may dissent, divide, break
into Schisms and Factions, sue and implead each other at the Law, yea, wholly
break up into pieces and nothing."

24

Verna M. Hall, The Christian History of the Constitution of the United States of
America: Self-Government with Union. American Revolution Bicentennial
Edition, ed. Joseph Allan Montgomery (Foundation for American Christian
Education, 1979) 48, quoting Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration."
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to be regarded as "nursing fathers" (Isa. 49:22-23), in what way are they
obliged to promote the welfare of the church?

In what sense is the

magistrate "the minister of God" (Rom. 13:4)? Who is responsible to set
and uphold the moral standards of the community? Even if the prophetic
calling of the church to proclaim the word of God or the ministerial calling
of the magistrate to enforce it were not at issue, some manner of
involvement by civil officers in religious affairs and by church leaders in
civil affairs would be unavoidable. The church does not operate in a
political vacuum. Neither does the state operate in a religious vacuum.
Indeed, it is a basic premise of Christianity—despite periodic neglect of
this principle—that both church and state are ministries under the direct
authority of God and must govern their affairs within the framework of
God's revealed word, the Bible. The practical issue is, as it always has
been, to harmonize their respective activities.

III LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE
The historical norm in the relationship between church and state is some
kind of union or accommodation. The concept of a strict separation may be
no older than the country that first gave it substance. But its origin is
religious rather than secular.

The religious dissident, Roger Williams,

coined the phrase "wall of separation" long before Thomas Jefferson
penned his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or Justice
Hugo Black equated it with the First Amendment guarantees. In a letter to
John Cotton written in 1644, several years after Williams had been
banished from Massachusetts, he criticized the establishment concept,
citing as proof against it
… [T]he faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the
world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under the Old
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Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians under the New
Testament in the antitype, were both separate from the World; and that
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke
down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden a
wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He will ever please to
restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in
peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved out
of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, and
added unto his church or garden.25

The image of a wall of separation (Ezek. 42:20) is comparable to the motif
of a hedge protecting the church from the wilderness (Ps. 80:12; Isa. 5:1-9;
Ezek. 22:30), which was common to Puritan thought. The difference is that
Williams believed a strict separation was necessary to preserve the purity
of the church, while Cotton—probably with the example of Nehemiah in
mind—believed that the erection and maintenance of the wall was the work
of the Christian magistrate. For the leaders of Bay Colony, church and
state were properly enclosed within the wall rather than separated by it.26
This disagreement involved—and continues to involve—a basic difference
of theology. A century later, Isaac Backus, a Baptist leader who fought the
church establishment of Massachusetts during the War for Independence,
endorsed Williams as a herald of religious liberty and portrayed him as a
victim of religious persecution. Although this view prevails in the standard
25

Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government
in American Constitutional History (The University of Chicago Press, 1965) 56,
quoting Perry Miller, Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition
(Atheneum, 1966) 98.

26

Peter N. Carroll, Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance of
the New England Frontier, 1629-1700 (Columbia University Press, 1969) 8790,
10914. The ''wall” is variously used as a metaphor for the Christian magistrate or
the state itself.

40

Samson, Religious Liberty in the Early American Republic

histories, it appears to be based on a doubtful correlation of this incident
and the "Antinomian controversy." Indeed, Williams himself denied that
religious persecution was a factor in his banishment.27
It is Thomas Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation," however,
that has received the most attention. In his 1802 letter to the Baptists of
Danbury, Connecticut, President Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship,
that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.28

Edward S. Corwin's comment on the phrase and its use by Justice Black in
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947), sheds some light on the
political considerations—Jefferson's as well as the Court's—that have
affected its interpretation.
The eager crusaders on the Court make too much of Jefferson's Danbury
letter, which was not improbably motivated by an impish desire to heave a
27

Regarding the banishment of Roger Williams, Henry Martyn Dexter, the foremost
nineteenth century Congregationalist historian, wrote that “the weight of the
evidence is conclusive to the point that this exclusion from the colony took place
for reasons purely political, and having no relation to his notions upon toleration,
or upon any subject other than those, which, in their bearing upon the common
rights of property, upon the sanctions of the Oath, and upon due subordination to
the powers that be in the State, made him a subverter of the very foundations of
their government, and—with all his worthiness of character, and general
soundness of doctrine—a nuisance which it seemed they had no alternative but to
abate, in some way safe to them, and kindest to him!” Henry Martyn Dexter, As
To Roger Williams, and His 'Banishment' from the Massachusetts Plantation
(Congregational Publishing Society, 1876) 7980.

28

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Basic Documents Relating
to the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment (Americans United, 1965) 19.
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brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist hierarchy of Connecticut, whose
leading members had denounced him two years before as an "infidel" and
"atheist."

A more deliberate, more carefully considered evaluation by

Jefferson of the religion clauses of the First Amendment is that which
occurs in his Second Inaugural: "In matters of religion, I have considered
that its free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers
of the general government."

In short, the principal importance of the

amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective
jurisdictions of state and nation regarding religion, rather than in its bearing
on the question of the separation of church and state.29

It is ironic that this letter is taken as an expression of the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. At the time of the
Constitutional Convention and the first session of Congress, Jefferson was
serving as minister to France. He returned only after the Bill of Rights had
been sent to the states for ratification late in 1789. Instead, it was James
Madison who drafted the amendments and successfully steered them
through Congress, even though he did so with some reluctance because he
believed "the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the
federal powers are granted.30 While Madison conceded that a "properly
executed" bill of rights might guard against ambitious rulers, he warned
that
… [T]here is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am
sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public

29

Edward S. Corwin, American Constitutional History: Essays, eds. Alpheus Mason
and Gerald Garvey (Harper and Row, 1964) 20405.

30

Alpheus Thomas Mason, Free Government in the Making: Readings in American
Political Thought (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 1965) 320, quoting a letter of
Madison to Jefferson dated 17 October 1788. See Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights:
Its Origin and Meaning (New American Library, 1965) 5157.
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definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by
an assumed power.31

Madison’s reservations about specifying these rights found practical
expression in the provisions against a narrow construction of these rights in
the Ninth Amendment and against a broad construction of the granted
powers in the Tenth Amendment. In any event, the religion clauses that
were added to Article VI and the First Amendment, like Jefferson's later
comments, do not indicate a climate of opinion hostile to cooperation
between church and state so much as they reflect the lengthy, often bitter
struggle for disestablishment that had only recently been waged in Virginia
and was continuing in other states. They were understood as precautions
against a national establishment of religion—however "tolerant" it might
be—rather than as a disavowal of the fundamentally biblical, and largely
Christian, principles on which the constitutional system was based. Yet the
Supreme Court has resisted this understanding, as Mark DeWolfe Howe
observed:
A frank acknowledgment that, in making the wall of separation a
constitutional barrier, the faith of Roger Williams played a more important
part than the doubts of Jefferson probably seemed to the present Court to
carry unhappy implications. Such an acknowledgment might suggest that
the First Amendment was designed not merely to codify a political principle
but to implant a somewhat special principle of theology in the
Constitution—a principle, by no means uncontested, which asserts that a
church dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its better self. . . .
It is hard for the present generation of emancipated Americans to conceive
the possibility that the framers of the Constitution were willing to
incorporate some theological presuppositions in the framework of federal
government. I find it impossible to deny that such presuppositions did find
31
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their way into the Constitution. To make that admission does not seem to
me to necessitate the concession which others seem to think it entails—the
concession that the government created by that Constitution can properly
become embroiled in religious turmoil.32

Indeed, this ‘somewhat special principle of theology’ may have involved
not only Roger Williams' wall of separation against political corruption of
the church but also John Cotton's hedge of protection against religious
corruption of the Christian polity. Although the restriction of suffrage to
church members had disappeared by then,
similar precautions—such as the use of religious tests—were still common.
It was only with the assurance—however unrealistic—that religious liberty
was compatible with this principle that such restrictions were abandoned.

IV DISESTABLISHMENT
Religious liberty was seen by some of the founders as a means of
strengthening Christianity through sectarian competition while still
promoting an essentially biblical standard of law and justice. Even the
most latitudinarian of the founders were unwilling to disavow ethical
standards that the Bible makes binding on all times and all nations. A
century or more was to pass before religious liberalism began to
successfully challenge traditional Christianity in regard to law and
morality.

A

Virginia

Prior to 1776, attempts to obtain toleration for religious dissenters in
Virginia had largely failed. A number of Baptist preachers were beaten and
32
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jailed. James Madison was prominent among those who protested against
these persecutions in the name of "liberty of conscience.'' Following the
Declaration of Independence, a state convention was held to organize a
new government and draft a constitution.

Petitions from dissenting

churches called for freedom of worship, exemption from religious
assessments, and disestablishment of the Church of England.

George

Mason submitted a bill of rights that included a provision for religious
toleration written by Patrick Henry.

Madison objected to the word

‘toleration’ because of its implication that liberty is a matter of grace, not
right. He proposed that the wording be changed to guarantee "the full and
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,'' although
he added a restraining clause: "unless under color of religion the
preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly
endangered.”33
It took time to work out politically the practical implications of religious
liberty. Among the first concessions were the admission of dissenting
chaplains to the army and the suspension of church rates. While general
assessments were ended in 1779, the establishment remained.

The

following year, the validity of marriages performed by dissenting ministers
was recognized and responsibility for overseeing the poor passed from the
church vestries to a state office.34
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Meanwhile, churches of all denominations were being devastated by the
war. Numerous church building were destroyed and congregations were
deprived of their clergy.35 In response to this situation, the legislature,
which was still predominantly Episcopalian in its sympathies, passed an act
to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church, then quickly repealed it.
The repeal was soon followed by an act annulling all laws favoring the
Church and dissolving its ties with the state. But Patrick Henry sponsored
a "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion"
which won the support of George Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and
John Marshall. It appeared close to passage when Madison motioned for a
postponement of the final vote until the next session so that public opinion
could be registered. During the interim he wrote his famous "Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments" in which he observed:
The same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other religions, may establish with the same ease, any particular sect of
Christians in exclusion of all other sects, and the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever.36

“Establishment”, for Madison, clearly meant direct tax support for
churches.

Madison's campaign succeeded.

The assessment bill was

defeated the following autumn and Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, first introduced in 1779, was passed in January 1789.

35
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The last vestige of the old establishment—the glebe lands which supported
the clergy—did not finally pass away until 1840.37

B

Massachusetts

Much the same pattern of disestablishment was followed in other states,
although at a slower pace. In Massachusetts, Isaac Backus argued for
religious liberty as early as 1774 on the same principle of "no taxation
without representation" that his fellow patriots used in arguing for political
liberty, claiming that the legislators
… [N]ever were empowered to lay any taxes but what were of a civil and
worldly nature; and to impose religious taxes is as much out of their
jurisdiction, as it can be for Britain to tax America. … That which has made
the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a pound upon tea; but your law of
last June laid a tax of the same sum every year upon the Baptists in each
parish, as they would expect to defend themselves against a greater one.
And only because the Baptists in Middleboro have refused to pay that little
tax, we hear that the first parish in said town have this fall voted to lay a
greater tax upon us. All America are alarmed at the tea tax; though, if they
please, they can avoid it by not buying the tea; but we have no such liberty.
We must either pay the little tax, or else your people appear even in this
time of extremity, determined to lay the great one upon us. But these lines
are to let you know, that we are determined not to pay either of them; not
only upon your principle of not being taxed where we are not represented,
but also because we dare not render that homage to any earthly power,
which I and my brethren are fully convinced belongs only to God. We
cannot give in the certificates you require, without implicitly allowing to
men that authority which we believe in our consciences belongs only to
God. Here, therefore, we claim charter rights, liberty of conscience. And if

37
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any still deny it to us, they must answer to Him who has said, 'With what
measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.'38

Backus's plea to the Massachusetts legislature in December 1774 was
unavailing, as was his earlier appeal to the Continental Congress in
October. Legal oppression of dissenters had long been forbidden by law
and, although the form of an establishment remained, dissenters could
direct their church rates to the churches of their choice. Still, this law gave
opportunity for harassment and was greatly resented. Backus continued his
campaign, first proposing a bill of rights for Massachusetts in 1783 and
later approving the prohibition of religious tests in the U.S. Constitution.39
But the establishment held out until 1833.

C

The Dedham Case

Changes began with the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820
and the Dedham Case of 1818–1821.

An effort to dissolve the

establishment had failed but concessions were made at the Convention.
But it was a court ruling in favor of a political takeover of the First Church
of Dedham that finally laid the axe to the root of the Congregationalist
establishment. After the pastor of the church left in 1818 to assume the
presidency of a college, a faction of Unitarians obtained the support of a
majority of voters in the parish to elect a recent graduate of Harvard

38
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Divinity School. The school had been Unitarian since the board of Harvard
had been taken over in 1805.
A majority of the church members refused to accept the new pastor and,
after the parish—which included non-members—installed him anyway,
complained to officials about the takeover. A committee dominated by
Unitarians was called to investigate and decided in favor of the parish,
claiming that the veto power by the church majority was established in
custom rather than law. The Trinitarian majority then bolted the church
and took the records, communion service, and trust deeds with them. The
Unitarian faction retaliated by excommunicating them for "disorderly
walking and schism," then sued them for return of the property. The case
eventually went to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Chief Justice Isaac
Parker, who wrote the unanimous opinion in Baker v Fales, 16 Mass 487
(1820), was a leader of the Federalist-Unitarians. William McLoughlin
believes he was motivated by a belief that only a broad Erastian policy that
allowed majority rule within the parishes could preserve the old
establishment.

But the effect of the ruling was to put Trinitarian

Congregationalists into the position of a dissenting minority.40
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What struck the Trinitarian majority in Dedham even harder was the court's
claim that once they had seceded from the parish they ceased to exist, at
least in the eyes of the law (a view consistent with the old view that
unincorporated religious congregations had no legal standing).

Starting

from the assumption that "Churches as such, have no power but that . . . of
divine worship and church order and discipline" in any parish, the court
went on to declare "The authority of the church" is "invisible" and "as all to
civil purposes, the secession of a whole church from the parish would be an
extinction of the church; and it is competent of the members of the parish to
institute a new church or to engraft one upon the old stock if any of it should
remain; and this new church would succeed to all the rights of the old, in
relation to the parish." Somehow the Congregational churches had become
nothing but the creatures of the majority of qualified voters in the parish.
This would have shocked the founders of the Bay Colony.41

In the end, disestablishment in Massachusetts came about, as it did in
Virginia half a century earlier, because of the intrusion of public policy
considerations into church affairs to a degree that even offended many
members of the establishment itself.

The Standing Orders of

Massachusetts were suspended by constitutional amendment in 1833. E. R.
Norman concluded:
Even this victory would not have been so easily accomplished had not many
of the Congregational meeting-houses passed into the hands of Unitarian
pastors and so offended orthodox Trinitarians that they would rather have
the churches disestablished than countenance the propagation of error out of
public funds.42

(ed), Autobiography, Correspondence, Etc., of Lyman Beecher, D.D. (Harper &
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The establishment principle was not yet dead in Massachusetts, however:
only dormant. Four years later the Unitarian-dominated legislature, led by
Senate president Horace Mann, established a state Board of Education
along the lines of the Prussian state school system. Mann then resigned
from the legislature and became the Board's first secretary in order to
promote, to use his own words, "faith in the improvability of the race,-- in
their accelerating improvability."43 In his study of the origins of the early
American public school movement, Samuel Blumenfeld comments:
If the American public school movement took on the tone of a religious
crusade after Mann became Secretary of the Board of Education, it was
because Mann himself saw it as a religious mission.

He accepted the

position of Secretary not only because of what it would demand of him, but
because it would help fulfill the spiritual hopes of his friends. They had
faith that Mann could deliver the secular miracle that would vindicate their
view of human nature and justify their repudiation of Calvinism.44

This new establishment was by far a more subtle one but still noticeably
religious in character.

It came complete with a system of secular

seminaries called normal schools and was later reinforced by compulsory
attendance laws. The expressly "non-sectarian" religious purpose of the
schools helps account for the opposition from many orthodox pastors and
school masters as well as the controversy among various religious
traditions—both pro and con—it generated throughout the remainder of the

43
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century.45 If the practice of intruding politics into religion was simply a
matter of habit, it was certainly proving to be a difficult one to break.

V

INFLUENCE OF BIBLICAL THEISM

In a manner of speaking, the habit of intruding politics into religion—or
religion into politics—is not only a difficult one to break but impossible. A
religiously or politically neutral—or purely objective—standard of law and
government is as unimaginable as it is impracticable. This is not to say
that, by itself, any particular system of belief legally qualifies as a religion
or even plays the role of one.

For example, the Supreme Court has

wrestled for years with the problem of defining religion so as to include
some non-theistic systems of belief while not wishing at the same time to
give credence to every pretense, prejudice, or preference that calls itself a
religion.

The Court conceives religion at once too broadly and too

narrowly. The point is that any belief assumes a complete cultural or
ideological ensemble of which it is only one artefact. It is this ensemble
that represents the kind of ''ultimate concern" that Paul Tillich identified as
religious.

"Every law order is an establishment of religion," as R. J.

Rushdoony repeatedly emphasizes.46 "The point is this: all law is enacted
morality and presupposes a moral system, a moral law, and all morality
presupposes a religion as its foundation."47
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The maintenance of some kind of standard is unavoidable. Religion is not
the end of all rational inquiry—the convenient deus ex machina designed to
squelch further argument by appealing to a higher court—but the beginning
of it. One religious viewpoint or another will set the terms of debate. Greg
Bahnsen believes, for example, that the epistemologically self-conscious
Christian—what Bahnsen here refers to as a "presuppositionalist"—"must
challenge the would-be autonomous man with the fact that only upon the
presupposition of God and His revelation can intelligibility be preserved in
his effort to understand and interpret the world.''48 Accordingly, the effort
to understand and interpret the world is fundamentally religious.

The

practical consequence is simply this: any system of law or morality will
tend to either reinforce or contradict a given religion. In America, the
religion in question is predominantly Christian.
Assuming that law is an establishment of religion, it is proper to ask: what
set of religious presuppositions is embodied in the Constitution or--even
more fundamentally--in western culture? M. Stanton Evans restates what is
often obvious only to outside observers and adherents of other religions: it
is biblical theism that underlies the constitutional tradition.
Even on a brief recapitulation, it should be evident that we have derived a
host of political and social values from our religious heritage: Personal
freedom and individualism, limited government-constitutionalism and the
order-keeping state, the balance and division of powers, separation of
church and state, federalism and local autonomy, government by consent
and representative institutions, bills of rights and privileges. Add to these
the development of Western science, the notion of progress over linear time,
egalitarianism and the like, and it is apparent that the array of ideas and
48
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attitudes that we think of as characteristically secular and liberal are actually
by-products of our religion. It may be said, indeed, that the characteristic
feature of liberalism, broadly defined—classical as well as modern—has
been an attempt to take these by-products, sever them from their theological
origins, and make them independent and self-validating. On the whole, it
has not been a successful experiment.49

Biblical theism desacralizes—or secularizes---the natural order.

Some

religions begin with a multitude of fickle deities that man must propitiate or
attempt to control through iconic or symbolic magic. The Bible begins
with one transcendent God who creates the world and places man within it
as his steward. Liberty is possible because all creation is governed by
God's law. Otherwise, there is no security short of total control and politics
becomes a matter of conquest rather than consensus.
While the assumptions behind American constitutional law are secular in
their expression, many—if not most—of their guiding principles are
derived primarily or secondarily from biblical religion. The absence of an
express statement of religious purpose or even an acknowledgment of
divine blessings has been the subject of controversy over whether the
Constitution is a "secular" or "godless" document.50 While the religious
references it does contain are too oblique to satisfy critics who lament its
"political atheism,"51 other critics are equally offended by any expression of
public religiosity, regarding it as "religious treason" or as "an establishment
49
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of religion."52 But the earlier colonial charters and state constitutions were
similarly guided by practical considerations and were likewise sparing in
their religious references. The customary invocation of divine favor or
acknowledgment of God's blessings, usually found in the preambles of state
constitutions, is generally a later development inspired by the New England
covenants.
But the argument from silence is not a very satisfactory approach to the
question. The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution are also silent
about the question of sovereignty.53 The issues which prompted the calling
of the Philadelphia Convention related to the strengthening of an already
existing "perpetual Union" rather than the creation of an altogether new
political system. The assumption that the founders radically departed from
earlier principles and precedents is unnecessary, particularly considering
the attention they paid to the rule of law and the limitation of power. It is
more logical to assume a continuity of purpose.
With the exception of an incidental mention of religion and a brief
reference to "the Great Governor of the world," the Articles were similarly
silent on the subject of religion. Yet the retention by the states of "every
power, jurisdiction and right" not "expressly delegated to the United States"
did not prevent Congress from exercising its customary religious functions.
Congress issued proclamations of fast days and thanksgivings. It employed
chaplains, directed the importation of Bibles from Europe in 1777, and
endorsed the publication of the first American edition of the Bible in
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1782.54 If, as Leo Pfeffer maintains, the political leaders of this period
worked from an assumed consensus of opinion in support of Christianity,
there is little reason to suppose this assumption suddenly changed in 1787.
In fact, Robert Cord has challenged Pfeffer's separationist hypothesis
regarding the religion clauses of the Constitution, claiming that the facts
"prove beyond reasonable doubt that no 'high and impregnable' wall
between Church and State was in historical fact erected by the First
Amendment nor was one intended by the Framers of that Amendment."55
Cord notes that the new Congress continued to employ chaplains and even
provided direct aid to religion, sometimes in fulfilment of treaty
obligations. The first four Presidents except Jefferson proclaimed days of
public thanksgiving and prayer. Sunday continued to be observed as a day
of rest.56

54

B. F. Morris, Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of the United
States, Developed in the Official and Historical Annals of the Republic (George
W. Childs, 1864) 20626; Baird, above n 35, 26267.

55

Robert L. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current
Fiction (Lambeth Press, 1982) xiv.

56

Ibid 51-82. Sabbath or Sunday laws were enacted in some federal territories,
although not in all, and Sunday restrictions were observed generally: R. C. Wylie,
Sabbath Laws in the United States (The National Reform Association, 1905) 17586. During the John Adams Administration, Fast and Thanksgiving Day sermons
began to display a political bias that limited their national appeal and weakened
the authority of the federalist clergy of New England: W. DeLoss Love, Jr., The
Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England (Houghton, Mifflin and Company,
1895) 37379.

56

Samson, Religious Liberty in the Early American Republic

VI A RELEASE OF ENERGY57
The historian Richard Cornuelle maintains that a spirit of cooperation and
local self-government grew among the early colonists out of "an unusual
sense of interdependence, powerfully reinforced by the terrors of the
Atlantic

crossing."

58

These

early

Americans

democratization of community service."

pioneered

"the

Immigrants would establish

voluntary associations—with names like the Scots Charitable Society
(1657) in Boston and the Norden Aid Society in Hudson, Wisconsin—to
help them adjust to life in America.
Although the motives for reform during this period varied, they generally
fell into two broad categories:

expressly Christian evangelism and

missionary work, and broadly non-sectarian humanitarian programs. 59
These

motives

operated

side

by

side

and

were

often

almost

indistinguishable. With a few exceptions, what they shared was a strong
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emphasis

on

voluntary

cooperation

through

private

benevolent

associations, as opposed to relying on direct government intervention.
The objects of all this moral energy ranged from poor relief to legal reform
to preservation of the Sabbath to the salvation of seamen to vegetarianism
and the water cure, including temperance (“jumping on the bandwagon”
and “falling off the wagon”), the peace movement, the abolition of dueling,
public education, prison reform, various communal experiments, asylums
for the handicapped, health fads, feminism, the abolitionist movement, and
the literary movement that in many respects embodied or embraced so
many of them: Transcendentalism.60
It was the proliferation of such voluntary associations that so impressed
Alexis de Tocqueville on his visit to America in 1831.

But Eugen

Rosenstock-Huessy had an even larger view of the critical importance of
what he called the “freedom of endowment,” which provides a practical
foundation and expression for freedom of conscience:
The Truce of God, the free choice of a profession, the liberty to make a will,
the copyright of ideas—these institutions are like letters in the alphabet
which we call Western civilization. … They have emancipated the various
elements of our social existence from previous bondage. Each time one of
these institutions came into being, it had a stiffening effect on one type of
human activity. Each time it enabled man to direct his energies towards
ends that hitherto transcended his potentialities. Less and less did he remain
bound by the unchangeable traditions of his environment. A police force
means nothing less than the emancipation of the civilian within myself; for
without it, I should be forced to cultivate the rugged virtues of a vigilant
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man. To free the courts from the whims of a changing government exalts
my will and testament to a kind of immortality: something will endure when
I have passed away. And so each of these institutions was hailed as a
deliverance. Not one of them came into existence without the shedding of
streams of blood. Each of these institutions was accorded the greatest
sacrifices. The paradoxical truth about progress, then, is that it wholly
depends on the survival of massive institutions which prevent a relapse from
a stage which has once been reached.61

By the time Rosenstock-Huessy wrote in 1938, however, these institutions
and the liberties they upheld had been put at risk. Due to poor stewardship,
they are still at risk today. To drive his point home, Rosenstock-Huessy
cited Daniel Webster’s successful argument before the U.S. Supreme Court
on behalf of Dartmouth College, which had been chartered by the Crown,
against a takeover by the State of New Hampshire.62 Webster famously
concluded his argument: “It is, Sir, as I have said, a small college. And yet
there are those who love it.”

VII CONCLUSION
The American experiment in ordered liberty shows that nothing should be
considered so small as to fall below constitutional notice or protection. As
Webster himself put it in a speech, “The Spirit of Liberty:”
The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit; but it is also a
sharp-sighted spirit; it is jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous
of man. It demands checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it
entrenches itself behind strong defences, and fortifies itself with all possible
61
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care against the assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the
amiable weaknesses of human nature, and therefore it will not permit power
to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and
patriotic purpose come along with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with
flashy and temporary resistance to its legal authority. Far otherwise. It
seeks for duration and permanence. It looks before and after; and, building
on the experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the benefit
of ages to come. This is the nature of constitutional liberty; and this is our
liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it.63

Webster’s “Spirit of Liberty” reflects an understanding that both enabled
and accompanied the rise of religious liberty in America. Many of the
early commentators on the voluntary principle in religion took pains to
emphasize that no slight to religion was intended by dissolving the state
religious establishments. The idea of loosening churches from dependence
on the state treasury was as novel as the penitentiary system that drew
interested European visitors like Alexis de Tocqueville, and it drew similar
wonderment and comment. Francis Grund, who emigrated to America
from Bohemia, wrote that
Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political liberty;
and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of the affection which
they cherish from the institutions of their country. In other countries, where
religion has become the instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of
the liberal party to diminish its influence; but in America its promotion is
essential to the Constitution.64
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If the institutional separation of church and state had developed purely for
reasons of state, the character of the American religious tradition might
have followed a very different line of development.65 For example, the
disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church in France, when it finally
came during the French Revolution, was accompanied by violent
anticlericalism and was followed by the creation of a highly syncretistic
civil religion. Although there were strong fears of similar Jacobin violence
in America during this period, the disestablishment of churches proceeded
rather peacefully. The immediate effect of disestablishment, as Lyman
Beecher and others saw it, was to strengthen the character and prestige of
the churches themselves.66
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